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Moore’s Proof of an External World. Just Begging the Question 
Annalisa Coliva, New York 
The aim of this paper is to assess Moore’s Proof of an 
external world, in light of recent interpretations of it, namely 
Crispin Wright’s (1985) and James Pryor’s (unpublished). 
In the first section I will present Moore’s original proof 
and claim that, despite Moore’s intentions, it can be read 
as an anti-sceptical proof. In the following two sections I 
will present Wright’s and Pryor’s interpretations of it. 
Finally, I will claim that if we grant some of Pryor’s intui-
tions, it is true that the proof does not exhibit what Wright 
calls “transmission-failure” and Pryor misleadingly presents 
as a case of question-begging argument. I will then offer 
my own interpretation of what a question-begging argu-
ment is. On that basis, I will claim that, contrary to what 
Pryor maintains, Moore’s proof is not just wanting because 
of a generic dialectical shortcoming, but because it begs 
the question after all. 
1. Moore’s Proof: Moore 
Moore’s proof is often presented without mentioning the 
actual context in which it was first produced, and it is 
almost always presented as an anti-sceptical proof. The 
dialectical setting which is usually taken for granted 
features two characters: a sceptic about the existence of 
the external world and Moore himself in his capacity of 
common sense philosopher, par excellence. As a matter of 
fact, however, things are not that straightforward. For 
“Proof of an External World” (1939) is a long essay con-
sisting of two parts. In the first and more substantial part 
Moore takes his lead from Kant’s famous complaint that it 
is still a scandal to philosophy that nobody has proved that 
the external world exists. He then introduces a number of 
distinctions which should clarify the meaning of the expres-
sion “external world” and he concludes that in order to 
prove that the external world exists, one should prove that 
there are things that can be encountered in space and that 
exist independently of our minds. He then moves on to the 
proof. By holding his hand in front of him, so that he and 
his audience can see it, Moore says: 
(1) “Here’s one hand”; 
then he hides it. 
Then, following the same procedure, he says: 
(2) “Here is another”; 
then he hides it. 
Finally, without showing his hands again, he concludes: 
(3) “There are two human hands at present”. 
Since the conclusion concerns the existence of objects 
which can be encountered in space, despite the fact that 
they are not currently perceived, and that, therefore, 
exist independently of our minds, Moore claims that (3) 
entails: 
(4) “The external world exists”. 
Notice that so far Moore’s proof is only a proof against an 
Idealist who claimed that it is not the case that there is an 
external world, for he would claim that objects do not exist 
independently of our minds. Such an Idealist could 
presumably concede the truth of the premises, although I 
doubt that he would concede (3) and, therefore, the 
conclusion of the argument. However, nothing has been 
done so far to show that the premises are known – as 
opposed to be presumed by both Moore and the Idealist – 
to be true and that, therefore, the conclusion is likewise 
known to be the case. Hence, Moore’s proof, so far, can’t 
be taken to have any bearing against scepticism. 
In effect, a few years later, responding to his critics 
(Moore 1942), Moore himself claimed that his proof was 
meant to be against the Idealist and not against the 
sceptic. For he was aware of the fact that in order to read it 
as a proof against scepticism he should have proved that 
he knew his premises. In particular, he should have proved 
that he was not dreaming. But Moore candidly admitted 
that he could not prove that he was not dreaming, for all 
his evidence would have been compatible with the fact that 
he was dreaming. The interesting question then is this: 
Why is it that almost all the readers have taken Moore’s 
proof to be an anti-sceptical proof? And, moreover, did 
they have the right to do so, given Moore’s claims about 
his proof? 
After producing his proof, Moore goes on to say that his 
proof is a rigorous one because: 
(i)  the premises are different from the conclusion; 
(ii)  the conclusion really follows from the premises and 
(iii)  he knows his premises with certainty to be true. 
 
However, according to Moore, given (iii) and the fact that 
the inference is valid, knowledge of the premises, should 
transmit to the conclusion. Hence, if Moore really knew 
that there were hands in front of him, then he would also 
know that the external world exists. And this is a claim that 
a sceptic about the existence of the external world would 
find contentious. 
Now, how could Moore claim that he knew his premises 
(and hence his conclusion), while candidly admitting that 
he couldn’t prove that he knew them, while also realising 
that that was what he should have done in order to 
convince a sceptic of the fact that he knew his premises? 
The uncharitable answer would be that Moore was 
confused about what he was doing. The more charitable 
answer, and indeed the answer which explains, to an 
extent, the fascination Wittgenstein felt towards Moore’s 
work is rather the following: if you are a philosopher of 
common sense then, no matter how much the sceptic 
presses you by asking “How do you know that p?”, 
“Haven’t you realised that if you were dreaming that would 
be compatible with the evidence at your disposal but it 
wouldn’t follow that there are two human hands where you 
have seen them?”, you will stick to your guns, as it were, 
and respond: “I don’t know how I know it, but I do”. 
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This, as Wittgenstein noticed, is an answer that, al-
though it is badly expressed, because it portrays the atti-
tude we have towards certain propositions as akin to belief 
and knowledge, shows a deeply right attitude towards 
scepticism. An attitude that can be glossed as follows: “No 
matter what you say, I won’t give up on this”. The diagno-
sis of the extremely unpleasant consequences of giving up 
on this – let it be the very specific premises of Moore’s 
proof, in that very context, or its conclusion, viz. that the 
external world exists – and of why we cannot do it would 
have been for Wittgenstein to investigate in On Certainty. 
Yet, despite my charitable interpretation of Moore’s 
strategy against scepticism, the fact remains that he 
claimed that he knew his premises and that his argument 
was correct, from which it follows that the conclusion would 
be known too. In order to see whether this is really so, let’s 
now turn to Wright. 
2. Moore’s proof: Wright 
According to Wright, Moore’s proof can be reconstrued as 
follows: 
(1)   Here’s one hand; 
(2)   If there is one hand here, then the external world 
exists; 
(3)   The external world exists. 
Wright points out that the warrant Moore has for (1) is his 
visual experience.1 Now, that visual experience would be 
the same in case Moore were just dreaming of having a 
hand. Hence, that experience could be a warrant for (1) 
just in case Moore were antecedently warranted in 
assuming that the external world exists. Thus, the warrant 
Moore has for (1) presupposes that he had a warrant for 
(3) and, therefore, cannot transmit to (3) across that (valid) 
inference. 
According to Wright, Moore’s proof exhibits what he calls 
a “transmission failure”. Pryor claims that this is a new 
name for an old phenomenon, traditionally known as 
“begging the question”. But this is misleading in my view 
because one begs the question against someone else just 
in case one produces an argument which, at some point, 
assumes the falsity of the thesis of one’s opponent, or of 
what would follow from that thesis. By contrast, an argu-
ment that exhibits transmission failure is, as the name 
suggests, an argument in which the warrant one may have 
for the premises does not transmit to the conclusion, 
because its very being a warrant for the premises in the 
first place depends on the fact that one has already a war-
rant for the conclusion. 
Thus, on Wright’s view, Moore’s argument would fail 
because one’s perceptual evidence can be a warrant for 
(1) only if one has an antecedent warrant for the conclu-
sion (3), viz. that the external world exists. So, as a matter 
of fact, the argument is ineffective not because it begs the 
question, but because it can’t produce a warrant for (3). 
                                                     
1 To have a (defeasible) warrant for p is a weaker notion than knowing that p. 
Yet, to have a warrant for p is a necessary condition for knowing that p 
(according to a non-externalist notion of knowledge). So if the warrant does 
not transmit, a fortiori knowledge does not transmit. 
3. Moore’s proof: Pryor 
According to Pryor, it is not true that Moore’s proof exhibits 
a transmission failure. For, in his view, (1) is what he calls 
a “perceptual basic belief”: one’s visual experience has a 
content that can be taken at face value to form the 
corresponding belief, without having to have an antece-
dent warrant for (3). Hence, one’s visual experience gives 
one a warrant2 for (1), if one has no reason to doubt (3) 
and despite the fact that one has no antecedent warrant 
for (3). So, Moore’s proof, as such, does not fail to transmit 
a warrant, for one need not have any antecedent warrant 
for (3), in order to be warranted in holding (1) on the basis 
of one’s visual experience. Hence, in so far as one has no 
reason to doubt (3), one is warranted in holding (1) and 
that warrant transmits to (3) across that (valid) inference. 
Yet, according to Pryor, Moore’s proof is dialectically 
ineffective, because the sceptic doubts (3), viz. that the 
external world exists. According to Pryor, if one doubts that 
(3), then one thinks either that (3) is false, or, at least, that 
it is more likely to be false than true. Thus, by doubting that 
(3), one would hold that the original perceptual evidence at 
Moore’s disposal is defeated and that, therefore, Moore’s 
proof is formally correct, but dialectically ineffective 
because it starts with a (more probably or altogether) false 
premise. Hence, the proof cannot convince the sceptic that 
his doubts are misplaced. Yet, there is nothing wrong with 
the proof as such. Rather, it fails to persuade one of the 
parties within a certain dialectical setting, given the latter’s 
collateral beliefs. 
4. Assessing the reconstructions 
For present purposes, I will agree with Pryor that percep-
tual experience can give a subject a warrant for believing 
“Here’s one hand”. No doubt such an assumption should 
be further investigated. But there are some initial reasons 
in its favour. For instance, forming the belief that there is a 
hand in front of one on that basis is not unmotivated. For it 
is not like forming that belief on the basis of no evidence at 
all – as it would be the case if one had no perceptual 
experience whatsoever. Nor is it like forming that belief 
contrary to the evidence at one’s disposal – after all, the 
content of the subject’s visual experience is as of a 
(human) hand in front of her. Moreover, it seems odd to 
suppose that, ordinarily, in order to be entitled to take 
one’s perceptual evidence at face value to form a 
perceptual belief such as (1) one should also have some 
antecedent warrant for the belief in the existence of the 
external world. So, let us assume for the sake of argument 
and in light of the previous considerations that perceptual 
evidence can, in general, give one a warrant for (1), 
without having to have an antecedent warrant for (3). 
What remains to be seen is whether, in light of this 
assumption, Moore’s proof is wanting because it is 
dialectically ineffective, as Pryor maintains. In order to 
asses this issue we should consider in more detail the kind 
of dialectical setting in which the proof is produced. 
                                                     
2 As a matter of fact, Pryor talks about a prima facie justification. In conversa-
tion he has pointed out to me that he takes this notion to be equivalent to the 
generic notion of epistemic warrant used by Wright. 
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Contrary to Pryor, I do not think that the sceptic3 should be 
committed either to the belief in the non-existence of the 
external world, or to the fact that it is more probable that 
the external world does not exist. (The sceptic is no 
Idealist). Rather, I think that the sceptic is someone who 
claims that one cannot have a warrant for the belief that 
(and, a fortiori, one cannot know whether) the external 
world exists and this is a hypothesis that is compatible 
both with the existence and the non-existence of the exter-
nal world. So, I take it, the sceptic is agnostic as to 
whether (3) is the case.4 That is to say, the sceptic neither 
believes that the external world exists, nor that it doesn’t. 
Now, if Moore’s proof is produced against an agnostic, 
then, as a matter of fact, it neither exhibits a failure of 
transmission, nor some kind of dialectical ineffectiveness, 
if the latter is taken to be something over and above what I 
have offered as the proper characterisation of a real 
question-begging argument. For the agnostic claims that 
one can’t have a warrant for (and, therefore, can’t know 
whether) the external world exists. However, if one can’t 
have a warrant for (3), then one can’t have a warrant for 
(1) either, for (1) is a belief about the existence of a 
material object. More explicitly, if one holds with the 
agnostic that one can’t have a warrant for a belief of the 
generality of (3), then one is committed to holding that one 
can’t have a warrant for (1) either, since (1) is just a belief 
about one particular material object. 
However, according to Pryor’s reconstruction of Moore’s 
proof, that’s precisely what isn’t the case. For, according to 
Pryor, “Here is one hand” would be a perceptually basic 
belief, which would be warranted and, moreover, would be 
so independently of having a warrant for (3). But this is just 
to assume the opposite of what would follow from holding 
the view that one cannot have a warrant for the belief in 
the existence of the external world, viz. that one cannot 
have a warrant for that perceptual belief. In short: this is 
simply what I have characterised as begging the question 
against the best possible sceptic. 
                                                     
3 At least, a philosophical sceptic as opposed to someone who, in ordinary 
parlance, professes herself sceptic as to whether p is the case. 
4 Notice that agnosticism is not tantamount to open-mindedness. Agnosticism 
is a position earned through careful consideration of the reasons pro and 
against p and by finding both of them necessarily non-conclusive. Agnosti-
cism, therefore, is stable. By contrast, open-mindedness can be due to the fact 
that one has never considered whether p (or not-p) before. Or else, it can be 
due to having considered evidence both pro and against p without being in a 
position to decide (yet) which one of the two evidential sets is more compel-
ling. Hence, open-mindedness is not a stable a position. 
5. Conclusions 
I have argued that despite Moore’s intentions, his proof of 
an external world can be read as anti-sceptical argument. 
In presenting Wright’s reconstruction of the proof I have 
argued that transmission failure, which is what Wright 
offers as a diagnosis of the failure of the proof, and Pryor 
takes to be a form of question-begging argument, is in fact 
a different phenomenon. I have then claimed that if – as 
there are reasons to maintain – one agrees with Pryor that 
there are perceptually basic beliefs, then one should also 
agree that Moore’s proof isn’t ineffective because of 
transmission failure. Yet, I have argued that it would be 
equally wrong to suppose that the proof fails because of a 
generic dialectical shortcoming as Pryor maintains. Rather, 
it fails because it begs the question against the best pos-
sible sceptic, namely the agnostic. 
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